Further, when Sherpur was occupied, the sense of security then prevailing led us to spare the forts and villages in its vicinity. Even the old walls and isolated towers in the fields about were left untouched. We make war so humanely that, even in a country like Afghanistan, we are loth to let military exigencies override all other considerations. That we shall suffer for it now in loss of life is beyond question; for, at several points about the walls, cover is given to an attacking party, who can get within 400 or 500 yards of our bastions. On the eastern and southern sides this is particularly the case. Outside Bemaru, as I have said, are forts, villages, and orchards; while, between the three gates facing towards Cabul, the ground is similarly occupied. Fort Mahomed Sharif, so well known in the dreary days of 1841-42, still stands intact within 700 yards of the “72nd Gateway,” and about it are high walls and walled enclosures, which are sure to be occupied by sharp-shooters. Outside Deh-i-Afghan also are orchards and gardens, each with its strong open walls, and in the fields are ruinous walls, with an occasional tower, which we could easily have destroyed if we had foreseen that an investment was hanging over us. It is easy to be wise after the event; but there can now be but one view as to the defects of Sherpur. To defend it, simply, is now comparatively easy, even with the 6,000 men we have within its walls; but beyond defence, we can do nothing. It covers such an enormous area of ground, that when all our picquets and sentries have been placed, we have no one to spare; and though we have dismounted nearly the whole of our cavalry, there are not even 1,000 men available for outside work. If it were half the size, we should be as comfortable as in an Indian cantonment; or if we had 10,000 men here, and three or four more batteries of artillery, we could break up Mahomed Jan’s army without difficulty. But neither of these conditions exists, and we are quietly accepting the humiliation of investment, and witnessing the looting of Cabul and the Bala Hissar without being able to strike a blow against the enemy. The suddenness of the whole business is the most remarkable feature, and we now see to what imminent danger Sherpur was exposed when Generals Macpherson and Baker were sent out to force the fighting in Maidan. In the first week of December native rumours of 40,000 or 50,000 men gathering together to attack Cabul were freely circulated in the city, but little attention was paid to them. Later, there was the plain evidence of our cavalry scouts that 4,000 or 5,000 men were between Maidan and Argandeh, and to cut them off was the object of General Macpherson’s march into the Chardeh Valley, and of the _détour_ made by General Baker from Charasia to Maidan. General Macpherson, in carrying out his flank march to get between Mahomed Jan and Bamian, came unexpectedly upon Mir Butcha and