The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
all surplus grain and other food must be given up, each family only
retaining enough for its own consumption. The _bunniahs_ and others will
be heavy losers by this enactment; but as death is threatened in case of
disobedience, there is no option but to obey. They will find Mahomed
Jan’s short rule far different from ours, under which they amassed
rupees by thousands, and fleeced the strangers handsomely. The wholesale
looting that has gone on during the last two days has given the enemy
vast stores of treasure; and one report states that Yahiya Khan’s house,
which we only partially cleared out, has proved a mine of wealth to
them. The usual result has followed: they have begun to quarrel among
themselves. Every Afghan is not a Ghazi; and to the mind of the village
tribesman, far away from his home, it seems folly to risk farther
fighting, while such plunder has been already obtained. The Ghazis would
at all costs try to storm Sherpur, and repeat the victory of 1841-2, but
their fanaticism has not extended far, and it will have to rise to
fever-heat before it will face an assault. We have not much to fear in
that direction; but still with our small stock of ammunition, it would
be better, perhaps, if it did not take place. If made at night, our men
would probably blaze away 70 or 100 rounds; and if our reinforcements
were checked, we might seriously feel the want of ammunition.
To-day the sky has been overcast and the hills obscured with mist, so we
have been unable to communicate by heliograph with Luttabund. We believe
the garrison there to be quite safe, as news of any attack in that
quarter would reach us very soon. Colonel Hudson knows that we are
invested, and he will have taken every precaution to ensure his own
safety. There seems no disturbance among the Tezin Ghilzais as yet, and
the Safis of Tagao have not yet returned to their friends in Cabul.
Their losses must have been heavy on the 13th and 14th. The Kohistanis
who got away from the cavalry on the 13th did not all escape to their
homes. While the fight was going on near Cabul, the 12th Bengal Cavalry
at Butkhak were ordered to patrol the plain between that post and the
Logar river. Towards evening they came across eight men who were at once
made prisoners. They were all armed and well mounted, and, upon being
questioned, said they were friends of Wali Mahomed, on their way to
Tezin, to bring the Ghilzais down to aid the British. This statement was
telegraphed to Sherpur, but Wali Mahomed knew nothing of the men; and as
they had the accoutrements of a Guide sowar on one horse, and three new
Snider rifles, with 400 rounds of ammunition, they were ordered to be
shot. When told they were to die, they half-admitted that they were not
friends of Wali Mahomed. Their leader was a young Kohistani, who met his
death bravely enough: the second was a petty sirdar, who, in fear and
trembling, begged for his life; and the third was a village priest, who
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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