The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
In the meantime, our indecision has re-acted upon a section of the
citizens of Cabul, who dread another occupation by tribesmen. The Hindu
merchants are beginning to move out with their families and goods, and
are taking the road to Peshawur. I have had many chances of learning
their feeling from one of their number, an intelligent banker, well
versed in local politics. His explanation of the migration is that the
Hindus trusted in the British, and looked to them for protection—which
was promised. But when the rising took place, the British had enough to
do to hold Sherpur, and consequently they were left at the mercy of the
rabble about Mahomed Jan. They will not risk a second occupation, being
convinced that it will take place, as we have not really received any
considerable reinforcements. “Besides,” they add, “no man can say what
you will do next, whether you will go back to India, or occupy Cabul for
ever. We have waited for you to say what is to happen, and nothing has
come of it except loss to ourselves and insult to our women. We will
still wait, but this time in Peshawur, where we shall be safe. If the
Sirkar takes over Cabul, then we will return.” And so they are taking
their departure, and Cabul is losing many of its best citizens;
industrious, peace-loving men, whom we cannot easily replace. It is a
comment upon our “waiting-upon-Providence” policy which is not at all
pleasant. Besides, if these Hindus carry to India the idea that we
cannot protect them in Cabul, and spread this report throughout
Hindustan, the effect upon the minds of our own subjects east of the
Indus may be very serious. Prestige is such a delicate plant in Eastern
soil, that it should be carefully guarded. Our military preparations in
and about Cabul—the building of strong stone towers on the Bala Hissar
Heights and the Asmai Hill, the cutting of military roads to the Cabul
gorge, the re-occupation of the Bala Hissar, the clearing of the country
about Sherpur of forts and walls—do not convey much to these Hindus.
“You want more _men_ if you are to hold Cabul, and keep out your enemy.
What are 10,000 to 50,000? There must be 20,000 here to guard Sherpur
and the city.” They are men of peace, and their criticism of military
matters is weak; but they shrewdly enough ask if, after sickness and
wounds, our fighting men are more numerous now than two months ago. It
may be a small matter, after all, that these terror-stricken Hindus turn
their faces eastwards; but it should be remembered that, all through the
troublous times of the Durani dynasty, their forefathers, and they
themselves, have remained in Cabul, and they are only leaving the city
now, because they do not believe in the power of the British to hold it
against another army of 50,000 Afghans.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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