The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
It is now well established that the leaders of the mutineers are the
Amir’s most trusted friends. Kushdil Khan, who was sent specially by him
to meet Cavagnari at Shutargardan, was a prominent leader both at
Charasia and on the heights yesterday. Mahomed Jan, a general in Yakub’s
army, and of some importance among the powerful Wardak section of the
Southern Ghilzais, is also mentioned. There is no doubt of concealed
action among the Amir’s officers, and unluckily none of the leaders have
been taken. Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan is really the head of all. It now
appears that only one quarter of the magazine in the Bala Hissah was
looted, and there are now in that fortress about twenty-six guns in
perfect order and several rockets, old presents of the Indian
Government. Nawab Khan, colonel of artillery, came in yesterday to know
what orders General Roberts had to give about them, and was told they
were to remain there for the present. No one can suppose any captured
guns will be given to the Amir, who is still with us.
It was rumoured that 800 sepoys had kept together in a body, but this
story is now said to be false, all having dispersed except 100 who
escorted their leader, Mahomed Jan, towards Turkistan. The three
regiments at Ghazni are reported to be only five miles out of that
place, while four days ago our force from Candahar was at Makr, four
long marches from Ghazni. The enemy has been extremely well informed of
all our movements, though their source of information cannot be
absolutely fixed upon. Regular news was probably given by some of the
Amir’s retainers, who see all that goes on in our camp.
The political situation shows no development; the Amir coinciding in all
that is done, now that the flight of the mutineers has removed his
apprehension of Cabul being sacked. If the attack on the 8th had been
made earlier in the day, the only outlet for Mahomed Jan and his 2,000
troops would have been to Cabul itself.[14] The city would then of
course have been taken by storm, and, as Sir Frederick Roberts said in
his proclamation, we could not have been held responsible for the
consequences. At present the strictest orders prevail against any one
entering the city, which perhaps even now may harbour many mutineers.
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Footnote 14:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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