The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
Waterfield and seven sepoys wounded.
Meanwhile, a little affair had been going on at the Shutargardan itself.
When Colonel Money had sent off Major Griffiths to reinforce the Surkhai
Kotal, he took precautions for his own safety by ordering up two
companies of the 21st P.N.I. with a mountain gun to the ridge which
overlooks the Shutargardan camp. The move was a wise one, for the enemy
were on the other side within fifty yards of the crest, and were only
driven back with difficulty. They gathered together again and made a
second attempt, but were again unsuccessful. Their persistency induced
Colonel Money to proceed with two companies of the 3rd Sikhs and the
fourth mountain gun to the ridge, and he was able from this point to
watch the fight at the Surkhai Kotal. Seeing that Major Griffiths was
hotly engaged, he sent Jemadar Sher Mahomed (the native officer who did
such gallant work at Karatiga on the 27th of September) with a company
of the 3rd Sikhs to make a diversion on the enemy’s flank, and when the
tribesmen fled, this party doubled down upon them, and after killing
eight and wounding several others, joined in the general chase.
It was altogether a brilliant skirmish, this defeat of so large a body
of the enemy at the Surkhai Kotal; and we hope to give the 3rd Sikhs an
ovation when they march in here with General Hugh Gough in a few days.
The 21st move back to Ali Kheyl.
The garrison had, after the skirmish, to hear a siege which came about
in this way:—On the morning of the 14th it was found that the main body
of the enemy still held the position they had taken up after being
driven off the Surkhai Kotal. A wing of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry
was sent with orders to attack if they moved towards the Kotal, and a
company of the 3rd Sikhs went to the Karatiga Fort to bring up the
stores and ammunition left there. The fort was found to have been
thoroughly looted. Allahaddin, a brother of Padshah Khan, the Ghilzai
chief, reported that the enemy had been largely reinforced, and said
from 10,000 to 17,000 men had assembled, the whole country being in
arms. Colonel Money therefore wisely resolved to draw in his defences
under cover of night. The Surkhai Kotal was abandoned on the 15th. News
of 300 or 400 regular soldiers of the Amir’s army, armed with Sniders
and Enfields, joining the tribes was given soon afterwards. The enemy
showed in such numbers southwards of the ridge and to the south of the
camp that the outlying picquet was withdrawn and fell back upon the
strong picquet posts near the camp. On the 17th the enemy occupied the
road from Karatiga to Kassim Kheyl, and cut off the grass-supply. Their
numbers were so great that reasonable anxiety was felt about an attack,
so our men worked at strengthening the defences, and Captain Nicholson,
R.E., laid down wire entanglements at weak points to check any rush. In
the evening Allahaddin brought in the _jirgah_ who proposed some absurd
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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