It is, therefore, our duty and interest to respect it, and we must, as the interest of our common country demands it. According to the stipulations of the treaty we must meet enemies of our allies whenever the south requires it, as they are our enemies as well as the enemies of the south; and I feel sure that no such occurrence as the one we deplore would have taken place if all things were understood as I have endeavored to explain them. Indeed the true meaning of our treaty is, that we must know no line in the presence of our invader, be he who he may....[519] Colonel Cooper then addressed[520] the Indians and, after him, Major Pegg;[521] but they were not convinced and many of them went home, positively refusing to march farther with the army. Meanwhile Cooper's call for reënforcements had reached McIntosh[522] and, as the need seemed so urgent, McIntosh resolved to supply it and notified Cooper to that effect. Subsequently, he decided[523] to take the field in person and to head a column, separate from Cooper's. What induced him to do this, nobody can well say. Cooper always felt that the incompleteness of the victory over Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, which was soon to come, was mainly attributable to the divided effort of the attacking force. In the two former engagements, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la's force, such as it was, untrained and miscellaneous, had greatly outnumbered the Confederate; but now the two were more equally matched in point of numbers and the chances of success were all on the southern side because of superior training and equipment, so Cooper was probably correct in his conjecture. McIntosh's excuse[524] for advancing precipitately and alone was, notwithstanding, very reasonable. The scarcity of forage made it expedient to march compactly; and the two generals had agreed, so McIntosh declared, when in conference at Fort Gibson, "that either force should attack the enemy on sight." The privilege of attacking Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la fell, under this arrangement, supposing it was made, to McIntosh, who had been able to push on in advance of Cooper. The Battle of Chustenahlah was fought in the early afternoon of December 26, 1861, and ended in what seemed the complete defeat of the Creeks. McIntosh reported that, although their position was strong, they were forced to retreat To the rocky gorges amid the deep recesses of the mountains, where they were pursued by our victorious troops and routed in every instance with great loss. They endeavored to make a stand at their encampment, but their efforts were ineffectual, and we were soon in the midst of it. The battle lasted until 4 o'clock, when the firing gradually ceased....[525]