The American JudiciaryBaldwin, Simeon E. (Simeon Eben)
History
The American Judiciary
Baldwin, Simeon E. (Simeon Eben)
Courts -- United States; Law -- United States -- History
However derogatory to the sovereignty of the States the
possession of such authority may seem and be, it is evidently a
necessary feature of our dual system of government. In some way
it was indispensable to provide for maintaining the full powers
of the United States against encroachments by State legislation,
and also for enforcing all the special limitations on the powers
of State legislation which the Constitution of the United States
lays down. This could have been done effectually in but two
ways: either by giving to Congress or to the President a veto
upon State laws; or by leaving the right of control to lie
dormant until a necessity for exercising it should arise, and
then putting it in the hands of the judiciary. The latter method
was clearly open to the least objection.[Footnote: See Hamilton's
discussion on this point in the _Federalist_, No. LXXX.]
Jefferson maintained that there was a third, and one which the
Constitution expressly provided. This was the calling of a
convention of all the States for proposing amendments to it. If,
he said, a State on the one hand by her highest authorities
asserts a certain line of action to be within her powers, and the
United States by their highest authorities deny it, "the ultimate
arbiter is the people of the Union, assembled by their deputies
in convention, at the call of Congress, or of two-thirds of the
States. Let them decide to which they mean to give an authority
claimed by two of their organs."[Footnote: Letter to Mr. Justice
Johnson, Tucker, "Life of Thomas Jefferson," II, 455.] There
seems a plain fallacy in this proposition. The question to be
decided, in case of a conflict of judicial authority, is not
which doctrine ought to be adopted, but which was adopted when
the Constitution was framed. To amend that instrument and make
it something else could not justly be allowed to alter the effect
of acts previously done.
But one serious proposition has ever been made to call a national
constitutional convention for any such purpose. That was by
Kentucky in January, 1861, when civil war was threatened; and it
was not pressed. The very delays which would be inevitable in
assembling such a body were then a reason for the call, for they
would give time for the "sober second thought." The plan,
however, seemed and probably was impracticable. The movement
toward secession had gone too far.[Footnote: Debates and
Proceedings of the National Peace Convention, 45, 61, 67.]
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