The American JudiciaryBaldwin, Simeon E. (Simeon Eben)
History
The American Judiciary
Baldwin, Simeon E. (Simeon Eben)
Courts -- United States; Law -- United States -- History
The general tendency of judicial practice in later years has been
to emphasize the influence of the judge upon verdicts. This
often extends to directing a verdict, peremptorily, for one party
or the other, when the law is clear upon the facts claimed or
admitted. Still more often it takes the shape of a caution as to
the weight that can properly be given to certain testimony, or an
opinion as to what really are the controlling sources of
evidence. Without the guidance of an intelligent judge, a jury
would frequently come to unfortunate and even unjust conclusions.
That there should be such guidance is an essential part of the
jury system, and it is generally given most effectually where the
judges are the ablest and the most independent.
The judge has at common law and by practice in most American
States a right in his charge to comment on the evidence and
intimate his opinion as to the weight which should or should not
be given to any particular testimony. It is a right to be
cautiously exercised, for juries are greatly influenced in their
conclusions by remarks of that character. They feel that he is
the head of the court, and there is a certain sentiment of
loyalty to him as well as of respect for any one occupying the
position in which they find him placed by the authority of the
State. Sometimes this power is abused. The judge desires to
indicate a decided opinion. He fears that if he put it in plain
words it might seem so strong as to indicate partiality, and
furnish ground of appeal. He therefore uses language, perhaps in
reference to the credibility of a witness, which looks fair and
even colorless on paper, but by the tone or emphasis in which
some vital word is uttered, or with the aid of a shrug or glance,
carries to those whom he is addressing an unmistakable conviction
that he means it to be taken in a certain sense. Any such
judicial action, however, is rare, and would be looked upon with
disapprobation by the bar.[Footnote: See Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. _v._ Howle, 68 Ohio State Reports, 614; 68
Northeastern Reporter, 4.]
If the case is one which has been pressed by counsel especially
upon the sympathies of the jury, such as a suit arising out of a
labor strike, or by a widow to recover for an injury resulting in
her husband's death, it is customary for the court to caution
them in their charge that justice and not sympathy is their rule
of duty.[Footnote: Bachert _v._ Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Co., 208 Pennsylvania State Reports 362; 57 Atlantic Reporter,
765.]
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