The American JudiciaryBaldwin, Simeon E. (Simeon Eben)
History
The American Judiciary
Baldwin, Simeon E. (Simeon Eben)
Courts -- United States; Law -- United States -- History
When a verdict is accepted judgment is rendered in accordance
with it. To this rule there are, however, certain exceptions.
It sometimes happens that a verdict is returned for a plaintiff
whose case as stated in his pleadings is one which in law is no
case; the defendant having failed to take this objection and made
his contest only on the facts. He then can ask the court not to
render any judgment upon it. This is technically called a motion
in arrest of judgment. Again, the verdict may be rendered, by
reason of the state of the written pleadings, on some immaterial
point, in favor of one party, when there are other points of
controlling importance in favor of the other, on which it has
been admitted that he is in the right. In such case the party
against whom the verdict is rendered may ask for judgment in his
own favor notwithstanding the verdict.
Verdicts are ordinarily given directly for the plaintiff or the
defendant. Printed blanks for such verdicts, one headed
"plaintiff's verdict," and the other "defendant's verdict," are
often handed to the jury when they retire, to choose from
according as they may find the facts. Such a verdict is called a
general verdict. Occasionally one of a different form is
returned at the request of counsel and by the permission of the
court. This is termed a "special verdict," and sets forth the
particular facts as found by the jury in detail, without finding
the ultimate issue for either party. This is only proper when
such a finding would have been simply a legal conclusion from
these facts. A special verdict leaves it to the court to apply
the law and render judgment as that requires.
In many causes the testimony is all taken out of court, before
some officer or arm of the court, who only reports his
conclusions from it as to the matters in controversy. This is a
common practice in equity, the case being sent to a "master in
chancery" for this purpose. In cases of a common law nature the
consent of both parties is generally required; but with that any
cause may be disposed of before an arm of the court commonly
termed an "auditor," "referee" or "committee."
The report of such a hearing sometimes is confined to the facts
which are found to have been established. In other cases it may
extend to a provisional decision of questions of law arising on
those facts. The ultimate decision of any question of law is
always for the court, and if it accepts the report it is its duty
to draw the proper legal conclusions from the facts established.
As to whether the report shall be accepted, and as to the legal
questions arising upon it, the parties have a right to be heard
in court. Improper or irregular conduct on the part of the
officer making the report may be shown as a cause for rejecting
it. If it is accepted the facts found generally stand as
conclusively established.
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