The losses of the navy in the war with Spain were extraordinarily small. There were but sixteen killed and sixty-eight wounded, of whom two died later. But even more remarkable, and it reflects the highest praise upon the service, was the state of health of the 26,102 men during this war of 114 days (April 21st to August 12th, inclusive). There were but fifty-six deaths in this period from disease, or at the rate of 6.85 per thousand a year. There were but thirteen cases of typhoid fever, and no death aboard ship from this disease and but one in hospital. There were but eighteen cases of dysentery. The marine battalion at Guantánamo numbered 588--21 officers and 567 men. There was no death from disease; only nineteen cases of malaria and no typhoid. The whole was a very remarkable showing; one never equalled elsewhere. And it should be remembered that it was in a climate, and indeed very largely in the same region, where, a century and a half before, the crews of some British ships were so swept by disease that they had in some cases to be renewed three times in but a moderate period of service. The health conditions of the American fleet showed an enlightened care which reflects honor upon all concerned. * * * * * The situation left us by the Spanish War is one which can be maintained only by a powerful fleet, though our acquisitions in themselves scarcely add to the necessity of such a fleet, for meanwhile we have built the Panama Canal. And while the canal has lightened our strategic difficulties in that our battle fleet can now reach San Francisco from the Caribbean in a fourth of the time it took the _Oregon_ to make her celebrated passage from San Francisco to Key West, there is upon us the heavy burden of the defence of the isthmus, its position being in effect insular. It can only remain in our hands by our controlling the sea. Fortifications assist in its defence for the time being, but should we go to war it must finally go into the hands of the power with a superior navy. And being thus isolated and having this insular character, the canal and its fortifications should be in naval control in order that there should be complete unanimity of effort in its defence. It is safe to say that however anti-imperialist one may be, there is no American who would see the canal go into foreign control with equanimity. The most pronounced would halt at such a danger. Thus whatever one’s attitude may be toward the Monroe Doctrine, there are few who would not uphold the contention that we shall not permit any further extension of foreign influence in the Caribbean or in any part of the neighboring Pacific littoral, or in neighboring islands such as the Galapagos. This is not a question of extension of influence, but of safety.