been a cessation of British impressment and there would have been no such orders in council as those directed to the destruction of American commerce; or had these come before America was ready with her navy there would have been quick renunciation.”[27] Gallatin, Jefferson’s Secretary of the Treasury, pressed to apply the surplus of two millions a year (“and,” said he, “it is a very low calculation”), which he considered would be lost in case of war, wholly “to the building of ships of the line.”[28] Said Gouverneur Morris in the Senate (and it was the expression of one of the ablest minds of the country): “When we have twenty ships-of-the-line at sea, and there is no good reason why we should not have them, we shall be respected by all Europe.... The expense compared with the benefit is moderate, nay, trifling. Whatever sums are necessary to secure the national independence must be paid.... If we will not pay to be defended, we must pay for being conquered.”[29] Instead of a fleet which would have commanded respect, the United States had built in the years 1801-1811 “two sloops of 18 guns and two brigs of 16, and out of twelve frigates had permitted three to rot at their moorings”; and this while 917 American ships had been seized by the British, many more than this number by the French, and our men taken from our vessels by the thousand and impressed into the British service. There is an official record of 6,257 of these, but it is known that the number ran to over 11,000. Such things, if we were to survive as a nation, could only bring war, whether Jefferson and Madison wished war or not. The instigators of such conditions had not long to wait to repent their folly.