The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912Blount, James H. (James Henderson)
History
The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912
Blount, James H. (James Henderson)
Philippines -- History -- 1898-1946; Philippines -- Politics and government -- 1898-1935
word "Independence" on their lips. When men have been thus fighting
against overwhelming odds for some sixteen months for government of
their people by their people for their people--however inarticulate
the emotions of the rank and file on going into battle--it is idle
to claim that they do not know what they want, whether the great
majority of the rank and file can read and write or not. But pursuant
to the idea that kindness would cure the desire for independence,
Judge Taft ignored, in the outset, all advice from the military
department, because that was not the kindness department, accepting
as truly representative of the temper of the whole people the views
of a few ultra-conservatives of large means who had always been part
and parcel of the Spanish Administration.
On the other hand, General MacArthur and the whole Eighth Army Corps
had seen a great insurrection drag on from month to month and from one
year to another, under General Otis, when short shrift would have been
made of it in the outset, and far less life sacrificed, if Mr. McKinley
had not needed, in aid of his Philippine policy, the support of both
of those who believed it was right and of those who believed it would
pay. The one central thought which had seemed to animate General
Otis from the beginning, a thought which we have already traced
through all its humiliating manifestations, was that he must neither
do or permit anything that might hurt the Administration. When the
"impatience of the people" at home, which figures so prominently in
the correspondence already cited between the Adjutant General of the
army, General Corbin, and General Otis at Manila, had begun to cast its
shadows on the presidential year, 1900, the master mind of Mr. Root had
interrupted the fatal Otis treatment of the insurrection, indicated by
General Otis's long failure to call for volunteers, his stupid stream
of "situation well in hand" and "insurrection about to collapse"
telegrams, and his utterly unpardonable persistence in calling it a
purely "Tagalo insurrection," by sending him a competent force, and
a plan of campaign, and directing him to carry out the plan. General
Otis did this, because he was told to, and then began again to sing
the same old song. MacArthur, Wheaton, Lawton, Bates, Young, Funston,
and the rest of the fighting generals, had submitted to all the Otis
follies without a murmur, because insubordination degrades an army
into a rabble. But they [329] believed the army was there to put down
that insurrection, not to have a symposium with its leaders on the
rights of man. They had taken up "The White Man's Burden," after the
manner of Lords Kitchener and Roberts, and they had no qualms. Above
all, they wanted peace, no matter how much fighting it took to get
it. Mindful of the attempts of the Schurman Commission of the year
before to mix peace with war, and of the immense encouragement thus
given the insurgents, they had not looked forward with enthusiasm to
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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