contingency, has already been mentioned. Its minutes say: If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental principles of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt will be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them. [130] On the other hand, the minutes of this same meeting as we saw recognized that America might be tempted into entering upon a career of colonization, once she should get a foothold in the islands. The programme of Aguinaldo and his people was thus, from the beginning, not to precipitate hostilities until it should become clear that, in the matter of land-grabbing, the gleam of hope held out by the American programme for Cuba was illusive. According to the minutes of the meeting alluded to, such a contingency would, of course, "drive them, the Filipinos * * * to a struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb to the weight of the yoke," etc. Such a struggle, as all the world knows, did ultimately ensue. That part of the parleying following Otis's demand of September 8th (that Aguinaldo move his troops) which was not useless was this: In order to "save their face," with the rank and file of their army, the Filipino Commissioners asked General Otis "if I [Otis,] would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated--something which he could show to the troops." [131] So, on September 13th, General Otis wrote such a "request," and Aguinaldo moved his troops as demanded, but no farther than demanded. He wanted to be in the best position possible in case the United States should finally leave the Philippines to Spain, and always so insisted. Long afterward General Otis insinuated in his report that this insistence, which was uniformly pressed until after the Treaty was signed, was mere dishonest pretence, to cloak warlike intentions against the United States. Yet, as we have seen above, one of our Peace Commissioners at Paris, Judge Gray, just about the same time, was taking that contingency quite as seriously as did Aguinaldo. And early in May, 1898, our Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Long, had cabled Admiral Dewey "not to have political alliances with the insurgents * * * that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future." [132] Before moving his troops pursuant to the Otis demand of September 8th, the Otis "request" was duly published to the insurgent army, and as the insurgents withdrew, the American troops presented arms in most friendly fashion. "They certainly made a brave show," says Mr. Millet (Expedition to the Philippines, p. 255), "for they were neatly uniformed, had excellent rifles, marched well, and looked very soldierly and intelligent." "The withdrawal," says General Otis (p. 10), "was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American forces." Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, with complete