It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. * * * The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us * * * into an adventurous departure on untried paths. By elaborate rhetorical gradations, the instructions finally get down to this: Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity. * * * The United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon. Though already noticed, we venture, in this connection, again to recall that in the month previous (August, 1898) a gentleman high in the councils of the Administration [142] declared in one of the great reviews of the period: "We see with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of our political maxims have outlived their force." Among these "revered maxims" thus suddenly fossilized by his ipse dixit, Mr. Vanderlip exuberantly includes the teachings of "Washington's Farewell Address and the later crystallization of its main thought by President Monroe"--the Monroe Doctrine, adding that in lieu of these "A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force * * * the mainspring of commercialism." As permanent chairman of the Philadelphia convention which renominated Mr. McKinley for the Presidency thereafter, in 1900, Senator Lodge, speaking of the issues raised by the Treaty of Paris, said: "We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade Expansion." "Philanthropy and five per cent. go hand in hand," said Mr. Vanderlip's Chief, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage, about the same time. Such was the temper of the times when the treaty was made. The first meeting with the Spanish Commissioners took place at Paris, October 1st. The opening event of the meeting, the initial move of the Spaniards, is extremely interesting in the light of subsequent events, especially in connection with the Iloilo Fiasco, hereinafter described (Chapter IX.). "Spanish communication represents," says Judge Day's cablegram to the President, [143] "that status quo has been altered and continues to be altered to the prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it describes as an auxiliary force to the regular American troops." Even diplomacy, in a conciliatory communication limited to the obvious, called the Filipinos our allies.