Lord George Germain's scheme for tiring out the Americans could not seem
altogether hopeless. Though from a military point of view the honours of
the war thus far remained with them, yet the losses and suffering had
been very great. The disturbance of trade was felt even more severely in
America than in England, and it was further exacerbated by the evils of
a depreciated currency. The country had entered into the war heavily
handicapped by the voluntary stoppage of importation which had prevailed
for several years. The war had cut off New England from the Newfoundland
fisheries and the trade with the West Indies, and the coasting trade had
been nearly annihilated by British cruisers. The problem of managing the
expenses of a great war was something quite new to the Americans, and
the consequent waste and extravagance were complicated and enhanced by
the curse of paper money. Congress, as a mere advisory body, could only
recommend to the various states the measures of taxation which were
deemed necessary for the support of the army. It had no authority to
raise taxes in any state, nor had it any power to constrain the
government of a state to raise taxes. The states were accordingly all
delinquent, and there was no resource left for Congress but to issue its
promissory notes. Congress already owed more than forty million dollars,
and during the first half of the year 1778 the issues of paper money
amounted to twenty-three millions. The depreciation had already become
alarming, and the most zealous law-making was of course powerless to
stop it.
[Sidenote: Lack of organization]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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