The Anabasis of Alexander : $b or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the GreatArrian
History
The Anabasis of Alexander : $b or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the Great
Arrian
Alexander, the Great, 356 B.C.-323 B.C.; India -- History -- To 324 B.C.; Iran -- History -- To 640
to him. He assured them that in this battle they were going to fight,
not as before, either for Coele-Syria, Phoenicia, or Egypt, but for
the whole of Asia. For he said this battle would decide who were to
be the rulers of that continent. It was not necessary for him to stir
them up to gallant deeds by many words, since they had this valour by
nature; but they should see that each man took care, so far as in him
lay, to preserve discipline in the critical moment of action, and to
keep perfect silence when it was expedient to advance in silence. On
the other hand, they should see that each man uttered a sonorous shout,
where it would be advantageous to shout, and to raise as terrible a
battle-cry as possible, when a suitable opportunity occurred of raising
the battle-cry. He told them to take care to obey his orders as quickly
as possible, and to transmit the orders they had received to the ranks
with all rapidity; each man remembering that both as an individual
and in the aggregate he was increasing the general danger if he was
remiss in the discharge of his duty, and that he was assisting to gain
a victory if he zealously put forth his utmost exertions.
CHAPTER X.
REJECTION OF PARMENIO’S ADVICE.
With these words and others like them he briefly exhorted his officers,
and in return was exhorted by them to feel confidence in their valour.
He then ordered the soldiers to take dinner and to rest themselves.
It is said that Parmenio came to him in his tent, and urged him to
make a night attack on the Persians; saying that thus he would fall
upon them unprepared and in a state of confusion, and at the same time
more liable to a panic in the dark.[400] But the reply which he made,
as others were listening to their conversation, was, that it would be
mean to steal a victory, and that Alexander ought to conquer in open
daylight, and without any artifice. This vaunting did not appear any
arrogance on his part, but rather to indicate self-confidence amid
dangers. To me at any rate, he seems to have used correct reasoning
in such a matter. For in the night many accidents have occurred
unexpectedly to those who were sufficiently prepared for battle as
well as to those who were deficiently prepared, which have caused the
superior party to fail in their plans, and have handed the victory
over to the inferior party, contrary to the expectations of both
sides. Though Alexander was generally fond of encountering danger in
battle, the night appeared to him perilous; and, besides, if Darius
were again defeated, a furtive and nocturnal attack on the part of
the Macedonians would relieve him of the necessity of confessing that
he was an inferior general and commanded inferior troops. Moreover, if
any unexpected defeat befell his army, the circumjacent country was
friendly to the enemy, and they were acquainted with the locality,
whereas the Macedonians[401] were unacquainted with it, and surrounded
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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