The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.Butler, Joseph
Religion
The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.
Butler, Joseph
Analogy (Religion); Apologetics -- Early works to 1800; Eschatology; Natural theology; Revelation
II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all creatures
which come under our notice, is such, as that they are capable
of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for which
they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we may indeed
conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of their faculties
naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally to acquire any new
qualifications. But the faculties of every species known to us, are
made for enlargement; for acquirements of experience and habits. We
find ourselves, in particular, endued with capacities, not only of
perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of
storing up ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of
acting, and of having different momentary impressions made upon us;
but of getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled
alterations in our temper or character. The power of the two last is
the power of habits. But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge
of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to the forming of
them. However, apprehension, reason, memory, which are the capacities
of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the
word habit is applicable to all these improvements, and in particular
how far the powers of memory and of habits may be powers of the same
nature, I shall not inquire. But that perceptions come into our minds
readily and of course, by means of their having been there before,
seems a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of
action, proceeding from being accustomed to it. Aptness to recollect
practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly habit in
many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits of action. An
instance of the former, is our constant and even involuntary readiness,
in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and
distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation,
imperceptibly to ourselves. It seems as if all other associations of
ideas not naturally connected, might be called passive habits; as
properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight, or
hearing of words. Our readiness in speaking and writing them, are
instances of active habits.
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