The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.Butler, Joseph
Religion
The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.
Butler, Joseph
Analogy (Religion); Apologetics -- Early works to 1800; Eschatology; Natural theology; Revelation
Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be
considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the
case will not be different: since it must be acknowledged, that such
a power was exerted. For supposing it acknowledged, that our Savior
spent some years in a course of working miracles:[164] there is no
more presumption, worth mentioning, against his having exerted this
miraculous power, in a certain degree greater, than in a certain degree
less; in one or two more instances, than in one or two fewer; in this,
than in another manner.
It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption, from the
analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when man was first
placed upon earth.[165]
Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history or
tradition, that religion was first reasoned out: but the whole of
history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the
world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the first ages of
which we have any account, seems to suppose and imply, that this was
the original of it among mankind.[166] And these reflections together,
without taking in the peculiar authority of Scripture, amount to real
and a very material degree of evidence, that there was a revelation
at the beginning of the world. Now this, as it is a confirmation of
natural religion, and therefore mentioned in the former part of this
treatise;[167] so likewise it has a tendency to remove any prejudices
against a subsequent revelation.
III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar
presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against
revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a course
of nature.
Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in
general, that before we can have ground for raising what can, with
any propriety, be called an _argument_ from analogy, for or against
revelation considered as something miraculous, we must be acquainted
with a similar or parallel case. But the history of some other world,
seemingly in like circumstances with our own, is no more than a
parallel case: and therefore nothing short of this can be so. Yet,
could we come at a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, from
being informed, whether such world had one, or not; such a proof, being
drawn from one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious.
More particularly:
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