_First_, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture; _i.e._ not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being; (for objections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which would equally conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. There are, indeed, some particular precepts in Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action; and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and really been so: which may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded, to cultivate the _principles_, and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts, which require only the doing an _external action_: for instance, taking away the property, or life of any. For men have no right, either to life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious, but for such precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences: _i.e._ from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not objections against revelation; but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial: and against the general constitution of nature. _Secondly_, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence: which shall be the subject of a following chapter.[185]