But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious, which may be grouped under two heads:--1. “Atheistic,” sometimes called the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter. 2. “Theistic,” which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS on Providence, PRICE’S Dissertations, RUTHERFORD on Providence, CHARNOCK’S Sermons, and WHATELY’S Logic.] [104] P. 157. [105] P. 158. [106] [HUME says, “though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent.” Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men an important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume found him out!] [107] By _will_ and _character_ is meant that which, in speaking of men, we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words _temper_, _taste_, _dispositions_, _practical principles_: _that whole frame of mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another_. [108] Chap. ii. [109] P. 157, &c. [110] Chap. ii. [111] Dissert. II. [112] Serm. 2, at the _Rolls_. [113] Dissert. II. [114] However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it be intelligible to say, that _it is fit and reasonable for every one to consult his own happiness_, then _fitness of action, or the right and reason of the case_, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative to perception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of the fitness and lightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded. [115] P. 118. [116] P. 110, &c. [117] Chap. ii. [118] Dissertation II. [119] Pp. 68, 71. [120] Serm. 8th, at the _Rolls_. [121] [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers generally; such as Fichte, Hegel, D’Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux, and Holyoake--also, BELSHAM’S Essays, COLLINS on Liberty, CROMBIE on Phil. Necessity, HOBBES’ Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan, PRIESTLEY on Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the Will.