The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.Butler, Joseph
Religion
The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.
Butler, Joseph
Analogy (Religion); Apologetics -- Early works to 1800; Eschatology; Natural theology; Revelation
So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing motion by will
and choice; upon the destruction of a limb, this active power evidently
remains, unlessened; so that the living being, who has suffered this
loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had another limb to
move with. It can walk by the help of an artificial leg. It can make
use of a pole or a lever, to reach towards itself and to move things,
beyond the length and the power of its arm; and this it does in the
same manner as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things
nearer and of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of
our limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves;
though they are adapted, like the several parts of a machine, to be the
instruments of motion to each other; and some parts of the same limb,
to be instruments of motion to the other parts.
Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through a
microscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a place with a
staff, a week hence. His eyes and his feet no more determine in these
cases, than the microscope and the staff. Nor is there any ground to
think they any more put the determination in practice; or that his
eyes are the seers, or his feet the movers, in any other sense than
as the microscope and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs
of sense, and our limbs, are certainly _instruments_,[36] which the
living persons ourselves make use of to perceive and move with: there
is not any probability, that they are any more; nor consequently,
that we have any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to
any other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception and
motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind of
relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor consequently
is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these
instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving and moving agent.
And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which living
beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution; and
that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of
perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction;
shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the
dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and
instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents,
from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand
in any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by
death.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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