Not only does the drunkard draw down upon himself many diseases, both of body and mind, but if, in his intoxication, he commit any crime or misdemeanour, he becomes, like other subjects, amenable to the pains of law. In this respect, indeed, he is worse off than sober persons, for drunkenness far from palliating, is held to aggravate every offence; the law does not regard it as any extenuation of crime. “A drunkard,” says Sir Edward Coke, “who is _voluntarius demon_, hath no privilege thereby; but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it.” In the case of the King _versus_ Maclauchlin, March, 1737, the plea of drunkenness, set up in mitigation of punishment, was not allowed by the court. Sir George Mackenzie says he never found it sustained, and that in a case of murder it was repelled—Spott _versus_ Douglas, 1667. Sir Matthew Hales, c. 4, is clear against the validity of the defence, and all agree that “_levis et modica ebrietas non excusat nec minuit delictum_.” It is a maxim in legal practice, that “those who presume to commit crimes when drunk, must submit to punishment when sober.” This state of the law is not peculiar to modern times. In ancient Greece it was decreed by Pittacus, that “he who committed a crime when intoxicated, should receive a double punishment,” _viz._ one for the crime itself, and the other for the ebriety which prompted him to commit it. The Athenians not only punished offences done in drunkenness with increased severity, but, by an enactment of Solon, inebriation in a magistrate was made capital. The Roman law was, in some measure, an exception, and admitted ebriety as a plea for any misdeeds committed under its influence: _per vinum delapsis capitalis pœna remittitur_. Notwithstanding this tenderness to offences by drunkards, the Romans, at one period, were inconsistent enough to punish the vice itself with death, if found occurring in a woman. By two acts passed in the reign of James I., drunkenness was punishable with fine, and, failing payment, with sitting publicly for six hours in the stocks; 4 Jac. I. c. 5, and 21 Jac. I. c. 7. By the first of these acts, Justices of the Peace may proceed against drunkards at the Sessions, by way of indictment; and this act remained in operation till the 10th of October, 1828, at which time, by the act of the 9 Geo. IV. c. 61, § 35, the law for the suppression of drunkenness was repealed, without providing any punishment for offenders in this respect. Previous to this period, the ecclesiastical courts could take cognizance of the offence, and punish it accordingly. As the law stands at present, therefore, drunkenness, _per se_, is not punishable, but acts of violence committed under its influence are held to be aggravated rather than otherwise; nor can the person bring it forward as an extenuation of any folly or misdemeanour which he may chance to commit. In proof of this, it may be stated, that a bond signed in a fit