Will is the other power of the rational soul, [1015]which covets or avoids such things as have been before judged and apprehended by the understanding. If good, it approves; if evil, it abhors it: so that his object is either good or evil. Aristotle calls this our rational appetite; for as, in the sensitive, we are moved to good or bad by our appetite, ruled and directed by sense; so in this we are carried by reason. Besides, the sensitive appetite hath a particular object, good or bad; this an universal, immaterial: that respects only things delectable and pleasant; this honest. Again, they differ in liberty. The sensual appetite seeing an object, if it be a convenient good, cannot but desire it; if evil, avoid it: but this is free in his essence, [1016]much now depraved, obscured, and fallen from his first perfection; yet in some of his operations still free, as to go, walk, move at his pleasure, and to choose whether it will do or not do, steal or not steal. Otherwise, in vain were laws, deliberations, exhortations, counsels, precepts, rewards, promises, threats and punishments: and God should be the author of sin. But in [1017] spiritual things we will no good, prone to evil (except we be regenerate, and led by the Spirit), we are egged on by our natural concupiscence, and there is ἀταξία, a confusion in our powers, [1018]our whole will is averse from God and his law, not in natural things only, as to eat and drink, lust, to which we are led headlong by our temperature and inordinate appetite, [1019]Nec nos obniti contra, nec tendere tantum Sufficimus,—