The act of suicide ought not to be considered as a crime in the
legal definition of the term. It is not an offence that can be
deemed cognizable by the civil magistrate. It is to be considered a
sinful and vicious action. To punish suicide as a crime is to commit
a solecism in legislation. The unfortunate individual, by the very
act of suicide, places himself beyond the vengeance of the law; he
has anticipated its operation; he has rendered himself amenable to
the highest tribunal—viz., that of his Creator; no penal enactments,
however stringent, can affect him. What is the operation of the law
under these circumstances? A verdict of _felo-de-se_ is returned, and
the innocent relations of the suicide are disgraced and branded with
infamy, and that too on evidence of an _ex-parte_ nature. It is unjust,
inhuman, unnatural, and unchristian, that the law should punish the
innocent family of the man who, in a moment of frenzy, terminates his
own miserable existence. It was clearly established, that before the
alteration in the law respecting suicide, the fear of being buried
in a cross-road, and having a stake driven through the body, had
no beneficial effect in decreasing the number of suicides; and the
verdict of _felo-de-se_, now occasionally returned, is productive of no
advantage whatever, and only injures the surviving relatives.
When a man contemplates an outrage of the law, the fear of the
punishment awarded for the offence may deter him from its commission;
but the unhappy person whose desperate circumstances impel him to
sacrifice his own life can be influenced by no such fear. His whole
mind is absorbed in the consideration of his own miseries, and he even
cuts asunder those ties that ought to bind him closely and tenderly to
the world he is about to leave. If an affectionate wife and endearing
family have no influence in deterring a man from suicide, is it
reasonable to suppose that he will be influenced by penal laws?
If the view which has been taken in this work of the cause of
suicide be a correct one, no stronger argument can be urged for the
impropriety of bringing the strong arm of the law to bear upon those
who court a voluntary death. In the majority of cases, it will be
found that some heavy calamity has fastened itself upon the mind,
and the spirits have been extremely depressed. The individual loses
all pleasure in society; hope vanishes, and despair renders life
intolerable, and death an apparent relief. The evidence which is
generally submitted to a coroner’s jury is of necessity imperfect;
and although the suicide may, to all appearance, be in possession of
his right reason, and have exhibited at the moment of killing himself
the greatest calmness, coolness, and self-possession, this would not
justify the coroner or jury in concluding that derangement of mind was
not present.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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