The mercenary forces, accustomed to measure their fidelity by the largeness or continuance of their pay, were ever ready, on the least discontent, or the slightest expectation of a more considerable stipend, to desert to the enemy with whom they had just before fought, and to turn their arms against those who had invited them to their assistance. Thus the grandeur of the Carthaginians being sustained only by these foreign supports, was shaken to the very foundation when they were once taken away. And if to this there happened to be added an interruption of their commerce, (which was their sole resource,) arising from the loss of a naval engagement, they imagined themselves to be on the brink of ruin, and abandoned themselves to despondency and despair, as was evidently seen at the end of the first Punic war. Aristotle, in the treatise where he shows the advantages and defects of the government of Carthage, finds no fault with its keeping up none but foreign forces; it is therefore probable, that the Carthaginians did not fall into this practice till a long time after. But the rebellions which harassed Carthage in its later years, out to have taught its citizens, that no miseries are comparable to those of a government which is supported only by foreigners; since neither zeal, security, nor obedience, can be expected from them. But this was not the case with the republic of Rome. As the Romans had neither trade nor money, they were not able to hire forces to push on their conquests with the same rapidity as the Carthaginians: but then, as they procured every thing from within themselves; and as all the parts of the state were intimately united; they had surer resources in great misfortunes than the Carthaginians. And for this reason they never once thought of suing for peace after the battle of Cannæ, as the Carthaginians had done in a less imminent danger.