bloodshed, and then the Army and Navy would be called in. He spoke of "battle" and of "the enemy," and, as an inducement to one regiment reluctant to join, said that when the enemy had been located this regiment would be sent to suppress a disturbance "arranged" in Cork. The Unionists found in this statement a complete confirmation of their views on the plot; the Liberal Press scoffed at it, the ex-War Minister solemnly declared (April 18) that his whole aim had been a peaceful settlement; and the Financial Secretary of the War Office (at Coventry, April 18) said that there was "not one shred of truth in the document." On April 21 Mr. Bonar Law asked for "a judicial inquiry" into the military movements in question; the Prime Minister replied that the proper course was to move a vote of censure, and offered a day; Mr. Bonar Law asked if the Prime Minister was afraid to have the facts tested on oath. Stormy scenes took place during the next few days at question time in the Commons; a Liberal motion was put down calling on the Opposition leader to substantiate his charges or withdraw them; and, after seeing Sir A. Paget's account of his conversations with his officers, issued, with other documents, as a White Paper on April 22, the Opposition decided to move for an inquiry into the attempt to impose Home Rule on Ireland by force. This motion was debated on April 28. The White Paper contained much new matter as to the orders to the Third Battle Squadron (p. 60), and it was elicited in Parliament (April 22) that the Prime Minister had only learnt of these orders on March 21, and had then caused them to be countermanded; it contained, also, Sir A. Paget's account of his conversations with his officers. He had said that he was ordered to carry out certain "moves of a precautionary nature," which the Government believed would be understood to be precautionary and would not be resisted, but which he thought would set the country and Press ablaze and might lead to active operations against organised bodies of the Ulster Volunteers; and he explained the "concessions" to officers. He had to know before the second conference (pp. 56, 81) whether the senior officers held that "duty came before other considerations," and therefore he said that any officer who would be unable to obey the orders to be given him should absent himself from that Conference. But he had no intention of ascertaining the intentions of subordinate officers. He merely wished them to be informed of the exemptions, and of the penalty for refusal of officers not exempted to obey orders. But four of the seven generals misunderstood, and thought that officers not prepared to do their duty were to say so, and would then be dismissed from the service. Most of the officers of the Fifth Division, and those of the Third Cavalry Brigade, were thus misinformed (with a slight difference in the latter case). He regretted the misapprehension, for which he alone was responsible.