The First Lord of the Admiralty, whose opening words raised a scene, described the resolution as resembling "a vote of censure by the criminal classes on the police." The Statute Book applied to the action of the Unionists language far stronger than any they had the wit to use against Ministers. The Conservative party was committed to naked revolution, to tampering with military and naval discipline, obstructing highways and telegraphs, overpowering police and coastguards, piratical seizure of ships, and imprisonment of the King's servants. The democracy, who were urged to be patient, were learning how the party of law and order cared for law and order when it stood in the way of their wishes. And what of India, in view of the "devastating doctrine" of the Opposition leader? He did not wonder the old Conservatives were uncomfortable, but there was another section, which had instigated the resolution, and postponed "law and order" till it had to deal with Nationalists and Labour men. This section's lawlessness, if it succeeded, might convince Irish Nationalists that Ireland never gained anything except by force. The Orange Army was being used to destroy Liberal reform by setting up the veto of the force in place of that of the Peers. Coming to the substance of the motion, the First Lord treated the precautionary measures as consequent on the failure of the Prime Minister's offer for a settlement. Those who were preparing civil war were aiming at the subversion of Parliamentary government. The movement of the Fleet, decided upon on March 11, had reference to the general Irish situation. The protection of the depots was a separate question; they contained from thirty to eighty-five tons of ammunition, and were scattered about unprotected. The only ships used were two scouts, to avoid moving troops through Belfast, and two boys' training cruisers were diverted in the belief that the Great Northern Railway of Ireland would refuse to carry the troops, which it ultimately consented to do. The Government also made a confidential survey of the whole military position in Ireland. The War Office and Admiralty were constantly considering quite hypothetical contingencies, but here Sir A. Paget thought that the authorised movements might lead to far larger consequences. The Government did not accept his views, but it was a good fault to be over-cautious. He scornfully declined to give details of the precise measures to be taken against potential insurgents, but said the contingencies considered were: (1) an armed attack on the depots or the troops marching to protect them; (2) the measures to be taken if a Provisional Government were set up at Belfast. No movements were authorised, but Sir A. Paget was assured of support in any contingency, and if British troops were attacked it would be the duty of the Government to chastise the assailants. The use of force rested with the Opposition. The Government