The centre of interest lay in the Commons, and Sir Edward Grey's speech practically served for both Houses. All questions to Ministers were postponed, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced, without notice, a Postponement of Payments Bill, supplementing the Moratorium proclamation (p. 169) by empowering the Government to declare a general moratorium on occasion. By agreement, it was passed through all its stages at once; indeed, but for a protest from Mr. McCallum Scott (L., _Glasgow, Bridgeton_) it would not even have been read. The Bank holiday was prolonged for three days; but the stoppage was not to involve a general suspension of work and wages. Then Sir Edward Grey spoke. He said that Ministers, then as always, had worked for peace, but in vain. As to British obligations he had told the Russian Foreign Minister in 1908 that he could promise no more than diplomatic support, and in the existing crisis, till the day before, he had promised nothing more. During the general election of 1906, at the crisis which led to the Algeciras Conference, he had been asked if, should a Franco-German war break out, Great Britain would give armed support; he had replied that he could promise nothing which would not be fully supported by public opinion, but, if war were forced on France through the Anglo-French _entente_ regarding Morocco, British public opinion would rally to her support. The French Government had then suggested conversations on this support between military and naval experts; and he had agreed, after consulting Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, Lord Haldane, and Mr. Asquith--since he could not, owing to the general election, consult the Cabinet--on the understanding that such conversations should in no way bind the Government. In the Agadir crisis he took the same line, and on November 22, 1912, he exchanged letters with the French Ambassador to this effect, but agreeing that if either Great Britain or France had grave reason to expect an attack by a third Power or a menace to the general peace, both Governments should consult whether they should co-operate and what measures they should take in common. But the British Government remained perfectly free to decide whether it should intervene. In the Morocco question, however, it was pledged to diplomatic support; in the existing crisis France was involved because of its obligation of honour to Russia, which did not apply to Great Britain, a Power which did not even know the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance. But in view of the Anglo-French friendship, let every man look into his own heart and construe the extent of the British obligation for himself. In view of that friendship, the French Fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean, and if, in a war which France had not sought, her unprotected coasts were bombarded, he felt that Great Britain could not stand aside. And, from the point of view of British interests, suppose the French Fleet withdrawn from the