But, though the British people supported the war with practical unanimity, it was found necessary to stimulate recruiting by a platform campaign. A more effective method would doubtless have been to give news from the front; but few details were given of the great battle on the Aisne, and the feats of particular corps were not mentioned for fear that the enemy should find out what troops it had to face. War correspondents, again, were not allowed at the front, and arrangements to permit them were vetoed, after long waiting, by the War Office. An official account, by an "eye-witness," was supplied to the Press; but it contained little that was definite. Popular feeling was encouraged by the surrender of Duala and the investment of Tsingtau, and exasperated by the _Emden's_ raid on Madras; but recruiting was encouraged only by advertisement and by speech-making, following the Ministerial lead. The Prime Minister concluded his part in this campaign at Cardiff, where he addressed a thoroughly representative meeting of 9,000 persons (Oct. 2). He began by laying stress on the unparalleled unity of the British Empire in the war, which was due neither to ambition nor to ill-will. In regard to Germany in particular, British policy had aimed at establishing a firm basis for cordial relations; Ministers had repeatedly said that friendships with certain Powers did not imply coldness or hostility to others; but, as the Foreign Secretary had said (Nov. 27, 1911), "One does not make new friendships worth having by deserting old ones." Mr. Asquith then made an important disclosure. In 1912 the Cabinet had formally notified the German Government that Britain would "neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack on Germany." "Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which Britain is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object." But the German Government asked Britain for an absolute pledge of neutrality if Germany were engaged in war, and this at a time when Germany was enormously increasing both her aggressive and defensive forces, especially at sea. Only one answer was possible, but the British Government had continued, especially during the Balkan crisis, to work for peace. Both from a domestic and an international point of view the war could only be regarded as among the worst of catastrophes for Britain, but not the worst. In the four weeks since his Guildhall speech (p. 197) every day had increased the sombre and repulsive features of the German invasion--"worthy of the blackest annals in the history of barbarism." Had not Great Britain shown herself ready to strike with all her forces at the common enemy of civilisation and freedom she could only have gone down dishonoured to her grave. The world was as ready as ever to respond to moral issues. The new school of German ethics had taught for a generation that force alone was the test of right.