out the processes, and providing the components, which had hitherto been left to German or Austrian industry alone. Business had begun to adapt itself to the new conditions, and the Stock Exchange was about to reopen. Finally, the Government had carried out a number of daring measures, which had collectively averted a colossal economic disaster. Some of these, notably its huge purchases of sugar and the subsequent prohibition of the importation of that commodity (Oct. 24, p. 243) in order to prevent the sale of the German surplus, were severely criticised by orthodox economists, and set up speculation as to the possibility of a complete change after the war in the financial and commercial policy of Great Britain. But as war measures they were generally received with acquiescence. On all grounds, therefore, the British nation felt itself entitled to look forward to the issue of the struggle with quiet confidence, and to possess its soul in patience until a vigorous offensive should become possible in the spring. FOOTNOTES: [2] The Introduction to this pamphlet has been used in the following sketch of the negotiations, The Belgian Grey Book (Oct. 6), the Russian Orange Book (Sept. 21) and the French Yellow Book (Dec. 1) further set forth the Allies' case. Many of the official documents were published as a pamphlet by the _New York Times_. [3] "Great Britain and the European Crisis" (the "Penny Blue Book"), No. 107. [4] A letter from the Scottish Secretary contesting these statements was published November 21. CHAPTER VI. SCOTLAND AND IRELAND. I. SCOTLAND.