On receiving this document General Gough asked Sir John French if it meant that he would not be called on to order his brigade to assist in coercing Ulster to submit to Home Rule, and Sir John French wrote across it "I should read it so." Sir John French and Sir J. S. Ewart did not know that it was a Cabinet document, and no blame rested on them or on Sir A. Paget; but blame rested on himself for altering it, and, having been absent from the Cabinet meeting, he did not apprehend that his colleagues had seriously considered the document and regarded it in the form in which it had left their hands as a matter of vital concern. Having unintentionally misled his colleagues, he had tendered his resignation. It appeared, however, that this had not been accepted; and Mr. Balfour, after scouting the Ministerial explanation of the naval and military movements and defending Ulster's right to resist, asked how the Government explained the two "peccant paragraphs" which were binding on Colonel Seely and the Army Council, and which "the whole Army would take as its charter." They made it impossible to coerce Ulster. The Prime Minister, after declaring that the King had throughout observed every rule comporting with the dignity of a constitutional Sovereign, pointed out that in fact the Government had offered the Ulster counties exclusion till after two consultations of the electorate against an offer by the Opposition of one such consultation at once. Was it really believed that there was a plot to provoke Ulster? The movements were purely protective, and were ordered on March 14. Sir Edward Carson and his friends might equip a force said to number 100,000, but, if the Government consulted their general, it was an intrigue and an outrage. General Paget acted like any prudent general in the circumstances. The officers were uneasy, as to the possible initiation of active operations against Ulster, and sent in their resignations. When they came to the War Office, every one realised that there had been a misconception. On the 23rd, after the interviews, the Cabinet received the draft of the proposed letter from the Army Council to General Gough. They did not know of his previous letter nor did the War Secretary. They authorised the three first paragraphs of the letter from the Army Council, which gave no assurance of any sort and stated plainly the duties of the officers. As soon as he received the copy of the whole letter, he sent for the War Secretary, who explained how the two last paragraphs had been added, and said that it was too late to alter them, for General Gough had had the letter. Mr. Asquith pointed out to the House that General Gough's letter shifted the question to a remote and hypothetical contingency It was not right to ask an officer what he would do in such a contingency, still less could it be right for an officer to ask a Government to give him any assurance. Such a claim, once admitted, would put the