The ancient Jewish Doctors assert that the servant from the Strangers who at the close of his probationary year, refused to adopt the Jewish religion and was on that account sent back to his own people, received a _full compensation_ for his services, besides the payment of his expenses. But that _postponement_ of the circumcision of the foreign servant for a year (_or even at all_ after he had entered the family of an Israelite), of which the Mishnic doctors speak, seems to have been _a mere usage_. We find nothing of it in the regulations of the Mosaic system. Circumcision was manifestly a rite strictly _initiatory_. Whether it was a rite merely _national_ or _spiritual_, or _both_, comes not within the scope of this inquiry. ] II. We argue the voluntariness of servants from Deut. xxiii. 15, 16, "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee. He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose, in one of thy gates where it liketh him best; thou shalt not oppress him." As though God had said, "To deliver him up would be to recognize the _right_ of the master to hold him; his _fleeing_ shows his _choice_--proclaims his wrongs and his title to protection; you shall not force him back and thus recognize the _right_ of the master to hold him in such a condition as induces him to flee to others for protection." It may be said that this command referred only to the servants of _heathen_ masters in the surrounding nations. We answer, the terms of the command are unlimited. But the objection, if valid, would merely shift the pressure of the difficulty to another point. Did God require them to protect the _free choice_ of a _single_ servant from the heathen, and yet _authorize_ the same persons, to crush the free choice of _thousands_ of servants from the heathen? Suppose a case. A _foreign_ servant flees to the Israelites; God says, "He shall dwell with thee, in that place which _he shall choose_, in one of thy gates where it _liketh him_ best." Now, suppose this same servant, instead of coming into Israel of his own accord, had been _dragged_ in by some kidnapper who _bought_ him of his master, and _forced_ him into a condition against his will; would He who forbade such treatment of the stranger, who _voluntarily_ came into the land, sanction the _same_ treatment of the _same person_, provided in _addition_ to this last outrage, the _previous_ one had been committed of forcing him into the nation against his will? To commit violence on the free choice of a _foreign_ servant is forsooth a horrible enormity, PROVIDED you _begin_ the violence _after_ he has come among you. But if you commit the _first act_ on the _other side of the line_; if you begin the outrage by buying him from a third person against his will, and then tear him from home, drag him across the line into the land of Israel, and hold him as a slave--ah!