Spinoza and Leibniz belong to another age. Modern philosophy began with
a new emphasis upon self-consciousness. In his celebrated argument--"I
think, hence I am" (_cogito ergo sum_)--Descartes established the
independent and substantial reality of the thinking activity. The "I
think" is recognized as in itself a fundamental being, known intuitively
to the thinker himself. Now although Spinoza and Leibniz are finally
determined by the same motives that obtain in the cases of Plato and
Aristotle, they must reckon with this new distinction between the
thinker and his object. The result in the case of Spinoza is the
doctrine of "parallelism," in which mind is defined as an "infinite
attribute" of substance, an aspect or phase coextensive with the whole
of being. The result in the case of Leibniz is his doctrine of
"representation" and "preëstablished harmony," whereby each monadic
substance is in itself an active spiritual entity, and belongs to the
universe through its knowledge of a specific stage of the development of
the universe. But both Spinoza and Leibniz subordinate such conceptions
as these to the fundamental identity that pervades the whole. With
Spinoza the attributes belong to the same absolute substance, and with
Leibniz the monads represent the one universe. And with both, finally,
the perfection of knowledge, or the knowledge of God, is
indistinguishable from its object, God himself. The epistemological
subtleties peculiar to these philosophers are not stable doctrines, but
render inevitable either a return to the simpler and bolder realism of
the Greeks, or a passing over into the more radical and systematic
doctrine of absolute idealism.
[Sidenote: The Stoic and Spinozistic Ethics of Necessity.]
§ 168. We have met with two general motives, both of which are
subordinated to the doctrine of an absolute being postulated and sought
by philosophy. The one of these motives leads to the conception of the
absolutely necessary and immutable substance, the other to the
conception of a consummate perfection. There is an _interpretation of
life_ appropriate to each of these conceptions. Both agree in regarding
life seriously, in defining reason or philosophy as the highest human
activity, and in emphasizing the identity of the individual's good with
the good of the universe. But there are striking differences of tone and
spirit.
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