"After experience had taught me that all the usual
surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that
none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves
anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is
affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there
might be some real good having power to communicate itself,
which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all
else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the
discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous,
supreme, and unending happiness."[153:5]
In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in
the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great
work are, "Of Human Freedom":
"Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is
scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of
himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal
necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true
acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed
out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may
nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is
so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were
ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found,
that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things
excellent are as difficult as they are rare."[154:6]
[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Extension of Science.]
§ 58. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the extension
and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily interested in
the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and in the method
wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the philosophy of the
scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical. Such is the case
with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless intimately related to
Spinoza in the historical development of philosophy.
"Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I
first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth,
many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I
afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and
from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking
once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had
adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the
foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding
superstructure in the sciences."[155:7]
Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He
sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the
universe.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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