The term _idealism_ is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so opposed to idealism. The term _idealism_ is further confused on account of its employment in literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an independent meaning. [175:17] See _note_, p. 173. [176:18] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Part I, Fraser's edition, p. 259. [176:19] To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears the same name. [178:20] Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's _The World and the Individual, First Series_, pp. 426-427. CHAPTER VII THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION [Sidenote: The Normative Sciences.] § 73. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical importance depends upon the place which metaphysics assigns to the _human critical faculties_. Man passes judgment upon that which claims to be _true_, _beautiful_, or _good_, thus referring to ideals and standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment, have resulted in the development of the three so-called _normative sciences_: _logic_, _æsthetics_, and _ethics_. These sciences are said to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic attitude.[180:1] In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue between Socrates and the master sophist Protagoras, is concerning the possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless one knows _what is meant by it_. Even the possession of such a meaning was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping analogous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence, which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms, _virtue is knowledge_.