6. It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. To facilitate their transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable articles,--as biscuit, rice, &c.: the wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country, and to insure good treatment to their owners or drivers; and these vehicles should be arranged in parks at different points, so as not to take the drivers too far from their homes and in order to husband the successive resources. Lastly, the soldier must he habituated to carry with him several days' rations of bread, rice, or even of flour. 7. The vicinity of the sea is invaluable for the transportation of supplies; and the party which is master on this element can supply himself at will. This advantage, however, is not absolute in the case of a large continental army; for, in the desire to maintain communications with its depots, it may be drawn into operations on the coast, thus exposing itself to the greatest risks if the enemy maneuver with the mass of his forces upon the extremity opposite the sea. If the army advance too far from the coast, there will be danger of its communications being intercepted; and this danger increases with the progress of the army. 8. A continental army using the sea for transportation should base itself on the land, and have a reserve of provisions independent of its ships, and a line of retreat prepared on the extremity of its strategic front opposed to the sea. 9. Navigable streams and canals, when parallel to the line of operations of the army, render the transportation of supplies much easier, and also free the roads from the incumbrances of the numerous vehicles otherwise necessary. For this reason, lines of operations thus situated are the most favorable. The water-communications themselves are not in this case the lines of operations, as has been asserted: on the contrary, it is essential that the troops should be able to move at some distance from the river, in order to prevent the enemy from throwing back the exterior flank upon the river,--which might be as dangerous as if it were the sea. In the enemy's country the rivers can scarcely ever be used for transportation, since the boats will probably be destroyed, and since a small body of men may easily embarrass the navigation. To render it sure, it is necessary to occupy both banks,--which is hazardous, as Mortier experienced at Dirnstein. In a friendly country the advantages of rivers are more substantial.