In the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous mountain-ranges can generally be forced. The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those _insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army toward Turin or Carignano. When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened; but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.