Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance, the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and fortune, gains victories. Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations. The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details, the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm, superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805. As is evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than tactical combinations to accomplish it.