4. To attack the center and both wings at the same time, without having very superior forces, would be entirely in opposition to the rules of the art, unless one of these attacks can be made very strongly without weakening the line too much at the other points. 5. The oblique order has no other object than to unite at least half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing, while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique line. 6 The different formations, convex, concave, perpendicular, or otherwise, may all be varied by having the lines of uniform strength throughout, or by massing troops at one point. 7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position, and to keep in hand a strong reserve, well concealed, and ready to fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least expect to meet it. 8. It is difficult to state with precision what is the best method to use in forcing a hostile army to abandon its position. An order of battle would be perfect which united the double advantages of the fire of the arms and of the moral effect produced by an onset. A skillful mixture of deployed lines and columns, acting alternately as circumstances require, will always be a good combination. In the practical use of this system many variations must arise from differences in the _coup-d'oeil_ of commanders, the _morale_ of officers and soldiers, their familiarity with maneuvers and firings of all sorts, from varying localities, &c. 9. As it is essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may when thus threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if attacked by main force. History is full of examples of the success of such maneuvers, especially when used against generals of weak character; and, although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive and the hostile army is but little demoralized, such incomplete successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a skillful general should know how to employ the means to gain them when opportunity offers, and especially should he combine these turning movements with attacks by main force.