[Footnote 27: The great reserves must, of course, be also engaged when it is necessary; but it is always a good plan to keep back, as a final reserve, two or three battalions and five or six squadrons. Moreau decided the battle of Engen with four companies of infantry; and what Kellermann's cavalry accomplished at Marengo is known to every reader of history.] ARTICLE XXXII. Turning Maneuvers, and too extended Movement in Battles. We have spoken in the preceding article of maneuvers undertaken to turn an enemy's line upon the battle-field, and of the advantages which may be expected from them. A few words remain to be said as to the wide détours which these maneuvers sometimes occasion, causing the failure of so many plans seemingly well arranged. It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless, as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain _coup-d'oeil_ of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which he is accustomed, it is not difficult to understand why so many maneuvers of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded against others, and why such a movement which would have been hazardous in presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington might have entire success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself have been in the habit of moving in this manner. It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for any thing that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be more daring. A few examples drawn from history will serve to convince the reader of the truth of my statements, and to show him how the results of these extended movements depend upon the characters of the generals and the armies concerned in them. In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between their right and the remainder of their army,--the latter part remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. This inaction was the more extraordinary as the left of the Austrians had a much shorter distance to pass over in order to support their right than Frederick had to attack it; for the right was in the form of a crotchet, and Frederick was obliged to move on the arc of a large semicircle to reach it.