Among the turning maneuvers which have succeeded in our day, Waterloo and Hohenlinden had the most brilliant results. Of these the first was almost altogether a strategic operation, and was attended with a rare concurrence of fortunate circumstances. As to Hohenlinden, we will search in vain in military history for another example of a single brigade venturing into a forest in the midst of fifty thousand enemies, and there performing such astonishing feats as Richepanse effected in the defile of Matenpoet, where he might have expected, in all probability, to lay down his arms. At Wagram the turning wing under Davoust contributed greatly to the successful issue of the day; but, if the vigorous attack upon the center under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Bernadotte had not rendered opportune assistance, it is by no means certain that a like success would have been the result. So many examples of conflicting results might induce the conclusion that no rule on this subject can be given; but this would be erroneous; for it seems, on the contrary, quite evident that, by adopting as a rule an order of battle well closed and well connected, a general will find himself prepared for any emergency, and little will be left to chance; but it is specially important for him to have a correct estimate of his enemy's character and his usual style of warfare, to enable him to regulate his own actions accordingly. In case of superiority in numbers or discipline, maneuvers may be attempted which would be imprudent were the forces equal or the commanders of the same capacity. A maneuver to outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the center. Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications before giving battle, and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and effectual, and, moreover, they require no disconnected maneuver during the battle. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 28: For an account of these two battles, see Chapters II. and XXV. of the Treatise on Grand Military Operations.] ARTICLE XXXIII. Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March. The accidental and unexpected meeting of two armies on the march gives rise to one of the most imposing scenes in war. In the greater number of battles, one party awaits his enemy in a position chosen in advance, which is attacked after a reconnoissance as close and accurate as possible. It often happens, however,--especially as war is now carried on,--that two armies approach each other, each intending to make an unexpected attack upon the other. A collision ensues unexpected by both armies, since each finds the other where it does not anticipate a meeting. One army may also be attacked by another which has prepared a surprise for it,--as happened to the French at Rossbach.