Before the invention of fire-arms, surprises were more easily effected than at present; for the reports of artillery and musketry firing are heard to so great a distance that the surprise of an army is now next to an impossibility, unless the first duties of field-service are forgotten and the enemy is in the midst of the army before his presence is known because there are no outposts to give the alarm. The Seven Years' War presents a memorable example in the surprise of Hochkirch. It shows that a surprise does not consist simply in falling upon troops that are sleeping or keeping a poor look-out, but that it may result from the combination of a sudden attack upon, and a surrounding of, one extremity of the army. In fact, to surprise an army it is not necessary to take it so entirely unawares that the troops will not even have emerged from their tents, but it is sufficient to attack it in force at the point intended, before preparations can be made to meet the attack. As armies at the present day seldom camp in tents when on a march, prearranged surprises are rare and difficult, because in order to plan one it becomes necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the enemy's camp. At Marengo, at Lutzen, and at Eylau there was something like a surprise; but this term should only be applied to an entirely unexpected attack. The only great surprise to be cited is the case of Taroutin, in 1812, where Murat was attacked and beaten by Benningsen. To excuse his imprudence, Murat pretended that a secret armistice was in force; but there was really nothing of the kind, and he was surprised through his own negligence. It is evident that the most favorable manner of attacking an army is to fall upon its camp just before daybreak, at the moment when nothing of the sort is expected. Confusion in the camp will certainly take place; and, if the assailant has an accurate knowledge of the locality and can give a suitable tactical and strategic direction to the mass of his forces, he may expect a complete success, unless unforeseen events occur. This is an operation by no means to be despised in war, although it is rare, and less brilliant than a great strategic combination which renders the victory certain even before the battle is fought. For the same reason that advantage should be taken of all opportunities for surprising an adversary, the necessary precautions should be used to prevent such attacks. The regulations for the government of any well-organized army should point out the means for doing the last. ARTICLE XXXV. Of the Attack by Main Force of Fortified Places, Intrenched Camps or Lines.--Of Coups de Main in General. There are many fortified places which, although not regular fortresses, are regarded as secure against _coups de main_, but may nevertheless be carried by escalade or assault, or through breaches not altogether practicable, but so steep as to require the use of ladders or some other means of getting to the parapet.