2. Provide for the troops all the materials necessary (such as fascines and short ladders) to enable them to pass the ditch and mount the parapet. 3. Direct three small columns upon the work to be taken, skirmishers preceding them, and reserves being at hand for their support. 4. Take advantage of every irregularity of the ground to get cover for the troops, and keep them sheltered as long as possible. 5. Give detailed instructions to the principal columns as to their duties when a work shall have been carried, and as to the manner of attacking the troops occupying the camp. Designate the bodies of cavalry which are to assist in attacking those troops if the ground permits. When all these arrangements are made, there is nothing more to be done but to bring up the troops to the attack as actively as possible, while a detachment makes an attempt at the gorge. Hesitancy and delay in such a case are worse than the most daring rashness. Those gymnastic exercises are very useful which prepare soldiers for escalades and passing obstacles; and the engineers may with great advantage give their attention to providing means for facilitating the passage of the ditches of field-works and climbing their parapets. Among all the arrangements in cases of this kind of which I have read, none are better than those for the assault of Warsaw and the intrenched camp of Mayence. Thielke gives a description of Laudon's dispositions for attacking the camp of Buntzelwitz, which, although not executed, is an excellent example for instruction. The attack of Warsaw may be cited as one of the finest operations of this sort, and does honor to Marshal Paskevitch and the troops who executed it. As an example not to be followed, no better can be given than the arrangements made for attacking Dresden in 1813. Among attacks of this class may be mentioned the memorable assaults or escalades of Port Mahon in 1756, and of Berg-op-zoom in 1747,--both preceded by sieges, but still brilliant _coups de main_, since in neither case was the breach sufficiently large for a regular assault. Continuous intrenched lines, although seeming to have a better interconnection than lines of detached works, are more easily carried, because they may be several leagues in extent, and it is almost impossible to prevent an enemy from breaking through them at some point. The capture of the lines of Mayence and Wissembourg, which are described in the History of the Wars of the Revolution, (Chapters XXI. and XXII.,) and that of the lines of Turin by Eugene of Savoy in 1706, are excellent lessons for study.