Since we have included in the number of useful cases of detachments those intended for _coups de main_, it is proper to mention a few examples of this kind to enable the reader to judge for himself. We may call to mind that one which was executed by the Russians toward the end of 1828 with the view of taking possession of Sizeboli in the Gulf of Bourghas. The capture of this feebly-fortified gulf, which the Russians rapidly strengthened, procured for them in case of success an essential _point d'appui_ beyond the Balkan, where depots could be established in advance for the army intending to cross those mountains: in case of failure, no one was compromised,--not even the small corps which had been debarked, since it had a safe and certain retreat to the shipping. In like manner, in the campaign of 1796, the _coup de main_ attempted by the Austrians for the purpose of taking possession of Kehl and destroying the bridge whilst Moreau was returning from Bavaria, would have had very important consequences if it had not failed. In attempts of this kind a little is risked to gain a great deal; and, as they can in no wise compromise the safety of the main army, they may be freely recommended. Small bodies of troops thrown forward into the zone of the enemy's operations belong to the class of detachments that are judicious. A few hundred horsemen thus risked will be no great loss if captured; and they may be the means of causing the enemy great injury. The small detachments sent out by the Russians in 1807, 1812, and 1813 were a great hinderance to Napoleon's operations, and several times caused his plans to fail by intercepting his couriers. For such expeditions officers should be selected who are bold and full of stratagems. They ought to inflict upon the enemy all the injury they can without compromising themselves. When an opportunity of striking a telling blow presents itself, they should not think for a moment of any dangers or difficulties in their path. Generally, however, address and presence of mind, which will lead them to avoid useless danger, are qualities more necessary for a partisan than cool, calculating boldness. For further information on this subject I refer my readers to Chapter XXXV. of the Treatise on Grand Operations, and to Article XLV. of this work, on light cavalry. ARTICLE XXXVII. Passage of Rivers and Other Streams. The passage of a small stream, over which a bridge is already in place or might be easily constructed, presents none of the combinations belonging to grand tactics or strategy; but the passage of a large river, such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, the Inn, the Ticino, &c, is an operation worthy the closest study.