If you determine to fight vigorously until night, you may expose
yourself to a complete defeat before that time arrives; and if a forced
retreat must begin when the shades of night are shrouding every thing in
darkness and obscurity, how can you prevent the disintegration of your
army, which does not know what to do, and cannot see to do any thing
properly? If, on the other hand, the field of battle is abandoned in
broad daylight and before all possible efforts have been made to hold
it, you may give up the contest at the very moment when the enemy is
about to do the same thing; and this fact coming to the knowledge of the
troops, you may lose their confidence,--as they are always inclined to
blame a prudent general who retreats before the necessity for so doing
may be evident to themselves. Moreover, who can say that a retreat
commenced in the daylight in presence of an enterprising enemy may not
become a rout?
When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide
whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the
enemy as possible,--since this hurried movement might sometimes cause
the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its
salvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that,
in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to
retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well-arranged rear-guard of
sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check
for several hours.
Retreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which
they result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in
order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his
present one. This is rather a prudent maneuver than a retreat. It was
thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau toward Brunn to draw the
allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that
Wellington retired from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo. This is what I proposed
to do before the attack at Dresden, when the arrival of Napoleon was
known. I represented the necessity of moving toward Dippoldiswalde to
choose a favorable battle-field. It was supposed to be a retreat that I
was proposing; and a mistaken idea of honor prevented a retrograde
movement without fighting, which would have been the means of avoiding
the catastrophe of the next day, (August 26, 1813.)
A general may retire in order to hasten to the defense of a point
threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of
retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an
exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer
its supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost
battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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