This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms of the French. We give the same name of _division_ to masses of four regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813 should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order, would have executed one of the following formations:-- 1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight battalions.[57] 2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:-- I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is important that in every language there should be two different terms to express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion. Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the central one, the other two being in column on the wings. * * * * * After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:-- 1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive. 2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento. 3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry. I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for success.