have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon him the fate of Vandamme at Culm. I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be adopted under an urgent necessity. ARTICLE XXIII. Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or Strategic Reserves. When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or temporary bases,--which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as his own frontiers. A river with _têtes de ponts_, and one or two large towns secure from a _coup de main_ to cover the depots of the army and to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but, she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation, particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases, and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic reserve,--which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits deserve notice. STRATEGIC RESERVES. Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive, who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army has its own, and every corps d'armée or division should not fail to provide one.