Up to this time the fronts of the French armies had been large,--either to procure subsistence more easily, or because the generals thought it better to put all the divisions in line, leaving it to their commanders to arrange them for battle. The reserves were small detachments, incapable of redeeming the day even if the enemy succeeded in overwhelming but a single division. Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon made his _début_ in Italy. His activity from the beginning worsted the Austrians and Piedmontese: free from useless incumbrances, his troops surpassed in mobility all modern armies. He conquered the Italian peninsula by a series of marches and strategic combats. His march on Vienna in 1797 was rash, but justified by the necessity of overcoming the Archduke Charles before he could receive reinforcements from the Rhine. The campaign of 1800, still more characteristic of the man, marked a new era in the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the capture or destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less extended, and the more rational organization of armies in large bodies of two or three divisions was adopted. The system of modern strategy was here fully developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 were merely corollaries to the great problem solved in 1800. Tactically, the system of columns and skirmishers was too well adapted to the features of Italy not to meet with his approval. It may now be a question whether the system of Napoleon is adapted to all capacities, epochs, and armies, or whether, on the contrary, there can be any return, in the light of the events of 1800 and 1809, to the old system of wars of position. After a comparison of the marches and camps of the Seven Years' War with those of the _seven weeks'_ war,--as Napoleon called the campaign of 1806,--or with those of the three months which elapsed from the departure of the army from Boulogne in 1805 till its arrival in the plains of Moravia, the reader may easily decide as to the relative merits of the two systems. The system of Napoleon was _to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet_. He told me that he knew no other method of conducting a war than this. It may be said that the adventurous character of this great man, his personal situation, and the tone of the French mind, all concurred in urging him to undertakings which no other person, whether born upon a throne, or a general under the orders of his government, would ever dare to adopt. This is probably true; but between the extremes of very distant invasions, and wars of position, there is a proper mean, and, without imitating his impetuous audacity, we may pursue the line he has marked out. It is probable that the old system of wars of positions will for a long time be proscribed, or that, if adopted, it will be much modified and improved.