The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715Wakeman, Henry Offley
History
The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715
Wakeman, Henry Offley
Europe -- History -- 17th century
[Sidenote: =Altered political ideals, 1660.=]
The eighteen months which followed the peace of the Pyrenees form the
turning-point of the seventeenth century. Up to that time the ideas and
the policy which sprang from the controversies of the sixteenth century
had made themselves felt, albeit but dimly. As long as the battle
between the Church and Puritanism was being waged in England, as long
as Spain with her uncompromising Catholicism was still in the front
rank of European states, as long as Sweden, strong in the traditions
of Gustavus Adolphus, was still the first power in the north, it was
impossible to say that the interest of religious questions had quite
ceased to be the dominant interest in European politics. But the years
1660 and 1661 saw a great change, not so much in the motives and
ambitions which really actuated nations, as in the men who were called
upon to express them in politics. From the peace of the Pyrenees, Spain
retired from the arena of politics into a sleep of decay and decline,
and ceased to be of importance in the affairs of Europe, until the
ill-omened day when were seen gathering round her carcase the eagles
of the world prepared for deadly strife. From the Restoration in May
1660, England wholly surrendered any claim to be thought to be guided
by moral ideals in her policy at home or abroad, and offered herself
to the highest bidder, under the guidance of a king whose sole thought
was for his own personal comfort. The peace of Oliva, and the death of
Charles X. left Frederick William of Brandenburg the foremost figure
in northern Europe, and consecrated by the rewards of success the
policy of pure selfishness in its most shameless form. History often
has to note how among the contests inspired by religion, liberty and
patriotism, there is much of selfish intrigue and personal ambition;
how in the most sacred causes the dictates of humanity and of justice
are not unfrequently forgotten; and it may well be said, that the
spectacle of a Charles II. bartering away his country’s honour to gain
for himself immunity from trouble, or of a Frederick William cynically
breaking faith with the ally of yesterday because he could obtain
more from the ally of to-day, is only more repulsive, because less
hypocritical, than the ambition of an Elizabeth or a Philip II., which
attempted to conceal itself under nobler ideals. But after all, taking
men at their worst, which is always the most untrue of estimates,
it is something in international politics, where self-interest must
necessarily play so large a part, that its working should be concealed
as much as possible, even from those who are actuated by it. Moral
conventions are necessary where an agreed standard of moral principle
is impossible, and bad faith is as reprehensible in diplomacy as the
employment of savages is in war. Those who use them may gain the
battle, but at the cost of civilisation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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