The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715Wakeman, Henry Offley
History
The ascendancy of France, 1598-1715
Wakeman, Henry Offley
Europe -- History -- 17th century
It was clear then that the question of the succession to the crown of
Spain could not be decided merely according to the legal claims of the
various candidates. The vast empire of Spain could not be disposed
of merely on principles which decide the devolution of a private
inheritance. Behind all personal claims, behind all legal rights,
behind even all national policy, loomed the greater principles of the
balance of power and the freedom of commerce. If the interests and the
rights of France could not permit the union of the Spanish inheritance
with the power of Austria, if the interests and the rights of the House
of Habsburg could no less permit the annexation of the empire of Spain
by the power of France, neither Germany nor England nor the United
Provinces could in the interests of Europe permit either the one or
the other. But if Europe was going to claim her right to be heard, if
claims of descent and of legal rights were to be subordinated to the
general good of the European family of civilised nations, the maritime
nations would assuredly demand their share in the commerce of the
Spanish Indies as the United Provinces would insist upon their barrier
against the aggression of France, and Austria the security of its hold
upon Italy.
With his usual diplomatic foresight Louis XIV. had grasped
the situation as long ago as the period of the war of Devolution. At
that time Charles II. was young and as yet unmarried. It was
quite possible that in spite of the weakness of his health he might
have children born to him before he died. [Sidenote: =The Partition
Treaty of 1668.=] Nevertheless his death might occur at any moment,
and Louis with his keen eye to the future determined to be ready for
all emergencies. He at once recognised the improbability of being able
to annex for himself or his house the whole of the Spanish dominions,
and accordingly decided to try and obtain by negotiation with the only
other serious candidate then in the field--the Emperor Leopold--that
part of the inheritance which was of most value to France. His policy
was completely successful, and on the 19th of January 1668 he concluded
with the Emperor a secret treaty for the partition of the Spanish
dominions, after the death of Charles II. without heirs, by
which the Emperor was to have Spain and the Indies and the Milanese,
and France the Netherlands, Franche Comté, Navarre, Naples, Sicily and
Catalonia. In the thirty years which elapsed between the partition
treaty of 1668 and the peace of Ryswick much had happened. [Sidenote:
=Changes in Europe since 1668.=] Louis had already annexed Franche
Comté, and become master of so much of the Spanish Netherlands as to
give France a safe and defensible frontier. The Netherlands were no
longer of the same value to France as they were in 1668, while their
acquisition was much more difficult. Since 1668 the United Provinces,
through their successful resistance to Louis in the Dutch war of 1672
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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